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THE ISSUE
The predicted effect of financial incentives on human behavior is 
a sharp theoretical dividing line between economics and …
psychology. (Colin Camerer & Robin Hogarth)
ECONOMICS
Incentives are the essence of economics. 
(Candice Prendergast)
Most of economics can be summarized in four words: 
People respond to incentives. The rest is commentary 
(Steven Landsburg)
PSYCHOLOGY
Money is not a motivator.
(I)ndividuals who are committed to excellence… are particularly 
unlikely to respond to financial incentives. (Alfie Kohn)
• Evidence on power of financial incentives in
work/employment situations primarily relates to 
simple/manual tasks where performance is measured by  
quantity.
- financial incentives matter.
• But what about quality-oriented tasks of so-called   
‘experts’?  Intrinsic motivation and ‘professional pride’
seem likely to be more important here.
• Laboratory evidence suggests financial incentives have 
little or no effect on performance quality.
THE EVIDENCE
1.Do experts exploit situations that allow them to extract   
rents from clients?
2. Can self-interested reputational concerns discipline expert 
behaviour?
3. Do experts put more ‘effort’ into tasks offering greater 
financial gain?
4. If you pay peanuts, do you get monkeys for experts?
FOUR QUESTIONS
QUESTION 1
Do experts exploit situations that allow 
them to extract rents from clients? 
SETTING
• REAL ESTATE AGENT-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
Net marginal return to agent is about 1.5%
Suppose additional effort by agent would yield extra 
$10,000 in price.  Opportunity cost to agent is $200, 
so has incentive not to expend extra effort.
But would do if also the owner.
• Compare sales prices of client- and agent-owned 
houses 
DATA
• 100,000 home sales in Illinois 1992-2002 (Levitt & Syverson,  
2005)
• 307,000 home sales in Texas 1998-2002 (Rutherford et al, 
2005)
• Collected information on home characteristics, location,      
marketing strategy, agent experience etc
RESULTS
After controlling for house characteristics etc
• On average, agent-owned houses sell for 3.7% more 
than client-owned houses in Illinois 
• On average, agent-owned houses sell for 4.5% more 
than client-owned houses in Texas 
Economically Plausible
• For the median house, premium corresponds to
$7700 in Illinois and $6000 in Texas.
CONCLUSION ON QUESTION 1
• Real estate agents obtain higher prices for own 
houses than for otherwise-equivalent client-owned 
houses.
• Apparently an example of a response to financial 
incentives that disadvantages clients - cannot rely 
on ‘professional pride’ for discipline.
QUESTION 2
Can self-interested reputational concerns 
discipline experts? 
It is maddening that society confers its blessings on traditional 
academic pursuits but views the study of horseracing as utter 
frivolity.
(Andrew Beyer)
SETTING
• RACEHORSE OWNER-TRAINER RELATIONSHIP
Client-owned: trainers receives fixed daily fee + 10% 
of winnings
Trainer-owned: trainers receive 100% of winnings
• Tradeoff between short- and long-run – REPUTATION
• Compare performance of client- and trainer-owned 
horses 
DATA
• Every harness horse that raced in NZ at least once 
during 1997-98 and 2002-03 seasons 
• 1997-98: 4087 horses, 27451 horse-races, and 984 
trainers
2002-03: 3861 horses, 27126 horse-races, and 852 
trainers
• Tracked performance, ownership and training 
details of every horse over entire season
• Also collected info on horse and trainer 
characteristics.
PERFORMANCE MEASURES
9*number of firsts + 5*number of seconds + 3*number of thirdsconsistency ratio =
9*Number of races during season
Stake earnings during the seasonearnings ratio = 
Sum of winning stakes from all races during season
RESULTS
B. Controlled for horse and trainer characteristics
Trainer-Owned Client-Owned Diff
Consistency Ratio 0.136 0.155 ***
Earnings Ratio 0.109 0.124 ***
A. Uncontrolled
Trainer-Owned Client-Owned Diff
Consistency Ratio 0.120 0.162 ***
Earnings Ratio 0.095 0.126 ***
00.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
Reputational Incentives (stable size)
WHAT DOES THIS HAVE TO DO WITH REPUTATION?
• Similar results with age/license proxies for reputation importance.
ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION
• Every $10K earned by typical horse when trainer-
owned becomes $11220 when client-owned.
• But all ownership ‘action’ occurs in stables with strong               
reputational incentives.
• Every $10K won by typical client-owned horse in small 
stable (weak reputation incentives) becomes $13400 
in large stable (strong reputation incentives).
• Mean performance of client-owned horses is 
approximately 12% better than that of trainer-owned 
horses.
CONCLUSION ON QUESTION 2
• On average, client-owned horses do better than 
trainer-owned horses
• But this advantage is apparent only in stables with 
strong reputational incentives
• The ability of long-term reputational incentives to 
discipline agents cannot simply be dismissed as a 
theoretical curiosity
• Most labour markets aren’t allowed to work as 
efficiently as that for horse trainers. 
QUESTION 3
Do experts put more ‘effort’ into tasks 
offering greater financial gain? 
• Or does ‘professional pride’ motivate them to treat all  
clients equally?
• Particularly germane to money managers, lawyers etc, but
data not available. 
SETTING
• STAY AT THE RACETRACK
Some horses race for much higher stakes than others
Trainers have incentive to devote extra effort to 
horses in high-stakes races.
Compare trainer effort/performance in high-stakes 
races with that in low-stakes races.
HOW CAN TRAINER EFFORT BE OBSERVED 
OR INFERRED?
• Punters set odds using available information.
• Can observe horse, trainer, driver quality etc, but don’t know how 
much effort stable has put in.
• If significant variation in trainer effort, then odds will be noisy     
estimate of true probabilities.
• High stakes races - all trainers put in optimal effort.
• So would see lower dividends on average in high-stakes races
DATA
• 30,450 harness races in NZ between 1993 and 
2006.
• Collected information on:
Race stake 
Race dividends - win, quinella, trifecta
Race characteristics - field size, track surface &
condition, dispatch method, distance
RESULTS
(including controls for field size and race ‘unpredictability’)
STAKE PERCENTILE
20th 80th 20% higher stake
WIN $6.00 $5.65 -1.6%
QUINELLA $23.45 $22.00 -2.0%
TRIFECTA $342.50 $313.45 -2.8%
(races for experienced horses only)
WIN $6.30 $5.90 -2.0%
QUINELLA $25.60 $23.90 -2.2%
TRIFECTA $391.55 $352.40 -3.2%
CONCLUSION ON QUESTION 3
• Market odds a better predictor of outcomes when 
stakes are high.
• Suggests that there is less ‘inside information’ to be
utilised in high stakes races.
• Consistent with experts choosing to prioritise high-payoff 
tasks.
QUESTION 4
⇒
?
If you pay peanuts, do you get
monkeys for experts? 
THE GENERAL IDEA
• NZ academic pay depends only on rank, not on discipline
If a university went ahead and paid equally,
lowering economists' pay and raising French
professors' pay, it would have a great French staff 
and a dreadful bunch of economists.
(Hamermesh, 2004, p180)
If peanuts beget monkeys, then the disciplines that are 
most ‘underpaid’ should have the weakest research 
performance on average.
IDENTIFYING PEANUTS & MONKEYS
Monkeys (PBRF)
• Average Quality Score
- arithmetical average of discipline-researcher
scores
• Proportion of R grades
- ‘prevalence of monkeys’ in discipline
Peanuts
• Available proxy: US discipline-specific academic salaries
‘Underpayment’ = average US salary - average NZ salary
SOME SIMPLE NUMBERS: I
MEAN MAX MIN
Average Quality Score
Proportion of ‘R’ grades 0.36 0.87         0.08
2.79 4.74 0.34
DISCIPLINE 
CHARACTERISTIC
‘Underpayment’ $20,910     $90520    -$340
SOME SIMPLE NUMBERS: II
Top-5 Average Quality Score
Discipline ‘Underpayment’ ranking
Philosophy 36
Anthropology 
and Archaeology 35
Earth Sciences 23
Ecology, Evolution 
and Behaviour 21
Biomedical 14
SOME SIMPLE NUMBERS: III
5 Most Underpaid
Discipline AQS ranking
Accounting & Finance 34
Management etc 31
Law 20
Marketing and Tourism 30
Computer Science etc 26
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• Moving from most to least underpaid decile predicts a rise in
average quality score of about 0.73 points, approximately 27% 
of the sample mean
RESULTS: I
(controlling for other determinants of research performance)
RESULTS: II
(controlling for other determinants of research performance)
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• Moving from least to most underpaid decile predicts a 14 
percentage point increase in the number of ‘R’ grades,  
approximately 39% of the sample mean
MONKEY ECONOMICS?
• Part-time workers
• New researcher bias
• Workload
• “Teaching matters too!”
• ‘Monkey-mimicking’ behaviour
CONCLUSION 4
• The greater a discipline's average salary in US 
universities, the weaker its research performance in NZ 
universities.
• NZ universities apparently get what they pay for: 
disciplines in which compensation is high relative to 
opportunity cost are best able to recruit high-quality 
researchers.
• Paying (relative) peanuts attracts mainly monkeys.
FINAL REMARKS
• Experts respond to financial incentives!
• Quality of performance is money-sensitive.
• But unknown whether this can be successfully exploited
- decrease intrinsic motivation
- unforseen consequences, e.g., ‘multitasking’
